The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes

The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes

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  • Create Date:2021-06-08 09:57:34
  • Update Date:2025-09-06
  • Status:finish
  • Author:Michael E. O'Hanlon
  • ISBN:0815736894
  • Environment:PC/Android/iPhone/iPad/Kindle

Summary

America needs better options for resolving potential crises

In recent years, the Pentagon has elevated its concerns about Russia and China as potential military threats to the United States and its allies。 But what issues could provoke actual conflict between the United States and either country? And how could such a conflict be contained before it took the world to the brink of thermonuclear catastrophe, as was feared during the cold war?

Defense expert Michael O'Hanlon wrestles with these questions in this insightful book, setting them within the broader context of hegemonic change and today's version of great-power competition。

The book examines how a local crisis could escalate into a broader and much more dangerous threat to peace。 What if, for example, Russia's "little green men" seized control of a community, like Narva or an even smaller town in Estonia, now a NATO ally? Or, what if China seized one of the uninhabited Senkaku islands now claimed and administered by Japan, or imposed a partial blockade of Taiwan?

Such threats are not necessarily imminent, but they are far from inconceivable。 Washington could be forced to choose, in these and similar cases, between risking major war to reverse the aggression, and appeasing China or Russia in ways that could jeopardize the broader global order。

O'Hanlon argues that the United States needs a better range of options for dealing with such risks to peace。 He advocates "integrated deterrence," which combines military elements with economic warfare。 The military components would feature strengthened forward defenses as well as, possibly, limited military options against Russian or Chinese assets in other theaters。 Economic warfare would include offensive elements, notably sanctions, as well as measures to ensure the resilience of the United States and allies against possible enemy reprisal。

The goal is to deter war through a credible set of responses that are more commensurate than existing policy with the stakes involved in such scenarios。

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Reviews

Руслан

I recommend the book to anyone who is interested in international relations and how they are changing in today's age。 The example of the challenge to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyudao) is illustrative and can apply to a dozen other places around the world。 I recommend the book to anyone who is interested in international relations and how they are changing in today's age。 The example of the challenge to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyudao) is illustrative and can apply to a dozen other places around the world。 。。。more

Rich Yoast

A very thought provoking book written, unfortunately, in a rather academic style。 At first it comes across as a college paper but the ideas soon predominate。 Much of the book looks at options for avoiding full scale war in areas of major conflict for China, Russia and the USA。 The main thesis is that great power military escalation can easily occur if alternative strategies to dampen conflict are not taken。 O'Hanlon offers a number of alternative strategies using three possible geographic confli A very thought provoking book written, unfortunately, in a rather academic style。 At first it comes across as a college paper but the ideas soon predominate。 Much of the book looks at options for avoiding full scale war in areas of major conflict for China, Russia and the USA。 The main thesis is that great power military escalation can easily occur if alternative strategies to dampen conflict are not taken。 O'Hanlon offers a number of alternative strategies using three possible geographic conflict areas。 Without discussing the particular examples he uses, his over all avoidance strategy for the US is to integrate input and thinking from a variety of field and government departments - not only the military and diplomatic areas。 Thus economic,cyber and other interests and strategies need to be fully integrated into military thinking (e。g。, for effective use of sanctions) as do alternative ways to have impacts on potential opponents and to utilize the capacities of other nations in concert with our own。 Although mentioned, O'Hanlon, I think, doesn't give adequate attention to how US domestic interests actually shape our external responses nor does he fully integrate how the role of messaging (clear, vague or mixed) might impact our responses。Almost half of the book is taken up with O'Hanlon's previous assessments and predictions of how various groups of weapons and technological capacities have progressed。 For a less informed reader like me much of this was eye opening if not fun to read。 But one point he makes a number of times is that in assessing US military and economic power vis a vis either Russia or China is that assuming we have allies, the total power and positioning of the US and its allies need to be considered - something China and Russia consider。 This consideration presents a very different perspective regarding the relative powers and capacities of the West。 。。。more

Kenton

Long on description of complexities found in a multi-polar international system, O'Hanlon offers some critical improvements to how Western strategists should view the transition of competition to conflict。 Most notably how economic means are left "on the table" during planning by defense professionals, when their inclusion would support dis-integration of adversary centers of gravity。 Long on description of complexities found in a multi-polar international system, O'Hanlon offers some critical improvements to how Western strategists should view the transition of competition to conflict。 Most notably how economic means are left "on the table" during planning by defense professionals, when their inclusion would support dis-integration of adversary centers of gravity。 。。。more

Patrick Anderson

Enjoyably readable, Michael is able to write about what in some cases could be an incredibly dry subject in a compelling and easy to follow way。 The argument he puts forward is backed up clear and well articulated arguments, it's hard to walk away from this text not agreeing with his point of view。 The future of deterrence depends on credible multifaceted plans that don't only live in the DOD and don't only consist of immediate large scale responses of a military fashion。 Just as the SIOP of old Enjoyably readable, Michael is able to write about what in some cases could be an incredibly dry subject in a compelling and easy to follow way。 The argument he puts forward is backed up clear and well articulated arguments, it's hard to walk away from this text not agreeing with his point of view。 The future of deterrence depends on credible multifaceted plans that don't only live in the DOD and don't only consist of immediate large scale responses of a military fashion。 Just as the SIOP of old was monolithic and unwieldy so to are the canned responses to actions of near peer actors violating the territory of treaty partners。 。。。more

Nils

Changes in military technology means that the U。S。 ability to continue to military defend (strategically worthless) assets (like the Senkakus) is coming to an end, and that the U。S。 needs to develop asymmetric military and economic deterrence and repulsion strategies。 O'Hanlon is most famous for his skeptical take on the much bruited Revolution in Military Affairs that was promoted in Washington military circles in the 1990s -- and this book serves partly as an "I told you so" about the methodol Changes in military technology means that the U。S。 ability to continue to military defend (strategically worthless) assets (like the Senkakus) is coming to an end, and that the U。S。 needs to develop asymmetric military and economic deterrence and repulsion strategies。 O'Hanlon is most famous for his skeptical take on the much bruited Revolution in Military Affairs that was promoted in Washington military circles in the 1990s -- and this book serves partly as an "I told you so" about the methodology he used to splash cold water on the "revolutionary" military technology forecasts two decades ago, and also a "this time it's different" argument, arguing that in fact a true revolutionary in military technology is oncoming in the NEXT twenty years -- except this revolution will in O'Hanlon's opinion be in many ways advantageous not to the U。S。 but to our adversaries, particularly to would-be peer competitors (read: China and maybe Russia) who can take advantage or strategically revolutionary but relatively cheap technologies like cyber and robotic swarms to neutralize U。S。 advantages in big-kit items like aircraft carriers and attack planes。 O'Hanlon's particular area of expertise is in submarine and counter-submarine technology, and at times his particular focus on that area of military technology becomes a bit of tunnel vision。 While O'Hanlon is alive to asymmetric opportunities, he is also primarily focused on the implications for interstate military conflict, not other sorts of adversaries。 This may represent an over-correction from the era of the GWOT。 。。。more